I distinctly remember thinking in my high school Gov’t class that the exclusionary rule was weird. Basically, the idea is that the primary mechanism for enforcing the 4th Amendment’s protection against unjustified searches is that evidence collected in violation of this Amendment cannot be used to convict someone. But this is weird because (a) it can lead to setting free people guilty of egregious crimes because of minute privacy violations and (b) it offers zero protection against privacy violations by the government for other purposes, such as convicting third parties. I always thought it was kind of missing the point.
(There doesn’t seem to be a good pure check againt privacy violations to be found in the court system. Right now, you can apparently sue the federal government through the Federal Tort Claims Act for privacy violations, but only if the government agrees. Similar situations exist with the states.)
Now, as it turns out, problem (b) is front-and-center in the debate over FISC‘s powers. It’s true that normal criminal courts grant warrants in a non-adversarial setting, just like FISC does. But tptacek and dragonwriter point out on HackerNews that this is defensible because there is an adversary when this warrant is actually executed, and exclusionary rule can be used to rebuff unjustified warrants.
On the other hand, there is no defendant to challenge the warrant in the case of mass surveillance of the public. Anyone charged with with a crime as a result of this surveillance cannot claim the exclusionary rule, and people whose privacy was violated cannot (almost assuredly) get compensation. This second effect is even more true when the government uses the information, not to convict anyone of a crime, but to pursue extra-national goals like hunting terrorists. … [continue reading]
It seems to me that I can accurately determine which of two people is smarter by just listening to them talk if at least one person is less smart than I am, but that this is very difficult or impossible if both people are much smarter than me. When both people are smarter than me, I fall back on crude heuristics for inferring intelligence. I look for which person seems more confident, answers more quickly, and corrects the other person more often. This, of course, is a very flawed method because I can be fooled into thinking that people who project unjustified confidence are smarter than timid but brilliant people.
In the intermediate case, when I am only slightly dumber than at least one party, the problem is reduced. I am better able to detect over-confidence, often because I can understand what’s going on when the timid smart person catches the over-confident person making mistakes (even if I couldn’t have caught them myself).
(To an extent, this may all be true when you replace “smarter” with “more skilled in domain X”.)
This suggests that candidate voting systems (whether for governments or otherwise) should have more “levels”. If we all want to elect the best person, where “bestness” is hard to identify by most of us mediocre participants, we would do better by identifying which of our neighbors are smarter than us, and then electing them to make decisions for us (possibly continuing into a hierarchy of committees). This is an argument for having federal senators chosen by state legislatures.
Of course, there are many problems with additional levels, e.g. it is difficult to align incentives across just two levels.… [continue reading]
Physics StackExchange user QuestionAnswers asked the question “Is the preferred basis problem solved?“, and I reproduced my “answer” (read: discussion) in a post last week. He had some thoughtful follow-up questions, and (with his permission) I am going to answer them here. His questions are in bold, with minor punctuation changes.
How serious would you consider what you call the “Kent set-selection” problem?
If a set of CHs could be shown to be impossible to find, then this would break QM without necessarily telling us how to correct it. (Similar problems exist with the breakdown of gravity at the Planck scale.) Although I worry about this, I think it’s unlikely and most people think it’s very unlikely. If a set can be found, but no principle can be found to prefer it, I would consider QM to be correct but incomplete. It would kinda be like if big bang neucleosynthesis had not been discovered to explain the primordial frequency of elements.
And what did Zurek think of it, did he agree that it’s a substantial problem?
I think Wojciech believes a set of consistent histories (CHs) corresponding to the branch structure could be found, but that no one will find a satisfying beautiful principle within the CH framework which singles out the preferred set from the many, many other sets. He believes the concept of redundant records (see “quantum Darwinism”) is key, and that a set of CHs could be found after the fact, but that this is probably not important. I am actually leaving for NM on Friday to work with him on a joint paper exploring the connection between redundancy and histories.… [continue reading]
Now I would like to apply the reasoning of the last post to the case of verifying macroscopic superpositions of the metric. It’s been 4 years since I’ve touched GR, so I’m going to rely heavily on E&M concepts and pray I don’t miss any key changes in the translation to gravity.
In the two-slit experiment with light, we don’t take the visibility of interference fringes as evidence of quantum mechanics when there are many photons. This is because the observations are compatible with a classical field description. We could interfere gravitational waves in a two-slit set up, and this would also have a purely classical explanation.
But in this post I’m not concentrating on evidence for pure quantum mechanics (i.e. a Bell-like argument grounded in locality), or evidence of the discrete nature of gravitons. Rather, I am interested in superpositions of two macroscopically distinct states of the metric as might be produced by a superposition of a large mass in two widely-separated positions. Now, we can only call a quantum state a (proper) superposition by first identifying a preferred basis that it can be a superposition with respect to. For now, I will wave my hands and say that the preferred states of the metric are just those metric states produced by the preferred states of matter, where the preferred states of matter are wavepackets of macroscopic amounts of mass localized in phase space (e.g. L/R). Likewise, the conjugate basis states (e.g. L+R/L-R) are proper superpositions in the preferred basis, and these two bases do not commute.
There are two very distinct ways to produce a superposition with different states of the metric: (1) a coherent superposition of just gravitational radiation Note that we expect to produce this superposition by moving a macroscopic amount of matter into a superposition of two distinct position or momentum states. … [continue reading]
Suppose we are given an ensemble of systems which are believed to contain coherent superposition of the metric. How would we confirm this?
Well, in order to verify that an arbitrary system is in a coherent superposition, which is always relative to a preferred basis, it’s well known that we need to make measurements with respect to (at least?) two non-commuting bases. If we can make measurement M we expect it to be possible to make measurement M` = RM for some symmetry R.
I consider essentially two types of Hilbert spaces: the infinite-dimensional space associated with position, and the finite-dimensional space associated with spin. They have a very different relationship with the fundamental symmetries of spacetime.
For spin, an arbitrary rotation in space is represented by a unitary which can produce proper superpositions. Rotating 90 degrees about the y axis takes a z-up eigenstate to an equal superposition of z-up and z-down. The rotation takes one basis to another with which it does not commute.
In contrast, for position, the unitary representing spatial translation is essentially just a permutation on the space of position eigenstates. It does not produce superpositions from non-superpositions with respect to this basis.
You might think things are different when you consider more realistic measurements with respect to the over-complete basis of wavepackets. (Not surprisingly, the issue is one of preferred basis!) If you imagine the wavepackets as discretely tiling space, it’s tempting to think that translating a single wavepacket a half-integer number of tile spacing will yield an approximate superposition of two wavepackets. But the wavepackets are of course not discrete, and a POVM measurement of “fuzzy” position (for any degree of fuzziness σ) is invariant under spatial translations.… [continue reading]
Unfortunately, physicists and philosophers disagree on what exactly the preferred basis problem is, what would constitute a solution, and how this relates (or subsumes) “the measurement problem” more generally. In my opinion, the most general version of the preferred basis problem was best articulated by Adrian Kent and Fey Dowker near the end their 1996 article “On the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics” in the Journal of Statistical Physics. Unfortunately, this article is long so I will try to quickly summarize the idea.
Kent and Dowker analyzed the question of whether the consistent histories formalism provided a satisfactory and complete account of quantum mechanics (QM). Contrary to what is often said, consistent histories and many-worlds need not be opposing interpretations of quantum mechanics Of course, some consistent historians make ontological claims about how the histories are “real”, where as the many-world’ers might say that the wavefunction is more “real”. In this sense they are contradictory. Personally, I think this is purely a matter of taste.a . Instead, consistent histories is a good mathematical framework for rigorously identifying the branch structure of the wavefunction of the universe Note that although many-worlders may not consider the consistent histories formalism the only way possible to mathematically identify branch structure, I believe most would agree that if, in the future, some branch structure was identified using a completely different formalism, it could be described at least approximately by the consistent histories formalism. Consistent histories may not be perfect, but it’s unlikely that the ideas are totally wrong.b . Most many-world’ers would agree that unambiguously describing this branch structure would be very nice (although they might disagree on whether this is “necessary” for QM to be a complete theory).… [continue reading]
This blog will be a place to put some of my thoughts that aren’t fully formed yet. Pre-preprints for the foreXiv.
I use too many parenthetical statements.… [continue reading]